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In this paper we study the decline of West Bengal relative to Maharashtra, historically two of
the most important states of India. In 1960, West Bengal’s per capita income exceeded that of
Maharashtra, the third richest state at the time. By 1993, it had fallen to just 69 percent of Maha-
rashtra’s per capita income. We employ a "wedge" methodology based on the ﬁrst order conditions
of a multi-sector neoclassical growth model to ascertain the output and factor market sources of
the divergent economic performances. Our diagnostic analysis reveals that a large part of West
Bengal’s development woes can be attributed to: (a) low sectoral productivity, especially in manu-
facturing and services; and (b) sectoral misallocation in labor markets between the manufacturing
sector and the other sectors of the economy. We also present evidence on the labor market, the
manufacturing sector, and public infrastructure that suggest a systematic worsening of the business
environment in West Bengal during this period.
K￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: West Bengal, Indian states, development, wedges
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In 1960, two of the three richest states in India were Maharashtra and West Bengal. Maharashtra,
home state of Mumbai (Bombay), and West Bengal, home state of Kolkata (Calcutta), were centers
of commerce and industry. In addition, West Bengal had the social and physical infrastructure
that came with Calcutta’s past as the long-standing capital of the British empire. Over the next
three and a half decades, West Bengal signiﬁcantly underperformed relative to Maharashtra. West
Bengal grew at less than half the rate of Maharashtra (1.1 percent versus 2.4 percent), so that by
1993 its per capita output had fallen almost 35 percent relative to Maharashtra’s.
For a pair of regions at the right tail of the state per capita income distribution — moreover,
they had a similar sectoral distribution of output in 1960 — to diverge at such a rate for almost 35
years is remarkable in and of itself. What makes the experience of West Bengal and Maharashtra
even more remarkable is that these two regions are located within the same country and, as such,
are subject to the same national ﬁscal and monetary policies, as well as the same international
trade and capital ﬂow policies.
The purpose of this paper is to better understand the steep decline of West Bengal relative to
Maharashtra and to shed light on the broad output and factor market forces that have been the
proximate sources of the decline. In our view, this examination is a necessary step toward the
ultimate goal of ascertaining the state-speciﬁc policies, institutions, and/or degree of implemen-
tation of national policies that are the root causes of West Bengal’s underperformance. Viewed
from the broader context of empirical research on growth, we believe that a state-level analysis
delivers sharper implications for the forces that matter and the forces that do not matter than the
typical cross-country analysis.1 We investigate West Bengal’s performance relative to Maharashtra,
1This is primarily because more and better data are available. For example, compared to cross-country analysis,
state-level analysis involves data collection methodoogies that are in principle identical. This reduces the chances
that measurement error is confounding the results.
1because the comparison controls for any national or federal policies that were enforced similarly
across the two states. This helps narrow the set of proximate sources of the decline, as well as focus
the search for the root causes.
A natural approach would be to collect data on the two states’ performance, as well as data on
potential proximate causal factors, such as measures of investment, education, physical infrastruc-
ture, social infrastructure, institutional quality, etc., and then to run a standard growth regression.
However, such a study would run into the diﬃculty that arises with a limited number of observa-
tions (about 35) and a large number of potential variables. In addition, as we alluded to above,
a key diﬀerence between the two states may lie in diﬀerences in enforcement of national policies.
This would be diﬃcult to ascertain in the data.
Consequently, we conduct in our main analysis a model-based diagnostic exercise. We derive
the optimality conditions from a frictionless, multi-sector neo-classical growth model. If optimality
holds, then the ratio of the left-hand side to the right-hand side of a ﬁrst order condition should
be one. To the extent this ratio does not equal one, a "wedge" exists. The exercise is aimed at
detecting the sources of the frictions or distortions that may have been responsible for the diﬀerential
performance of the two states. The multi-sector environment allows us to measure wedges in factor
allocations across sectors, in addition to intertemporal wedges.
Our methodology extends the wedge methodologies developed by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2004), Cole and Ohanian (2004), and especially Mulligan (2005).2 The distinguishing features of
our work are that we use a multi-sector model and we focus on long-term trends. The other papers
use a single sector framework and partially or wholly focus on the business cycle.
Our primary ﬁnding is that West Bengal’s productivity growth in manufacturing and services
was considerably lower than Maharashtra’s. The ratio of West Bengal’s manufacturing productivity
to Maharashtra’s manufacturing productivity, for example, declined from 0.85 to 0.36 between 1960
2This methodology is related to work by Ingram, Kocherlakota, and Savin (1994) and by others.
2and 1995. In addition, we ﬁnd that many of the wedges in the two states changed little or in the
same direction. This includes the investment wedge from the intertemporal Euler equation, which
was relatively stable over our sample period; the capital allocation wedges, taken together; and the
labor allocation wedge between agriculture and services, in which both states became less eﬃcient.
There were two wedges that behaved quite diﬀerently across the two states, the labor allocation
wedge between services and manufacturing, and the labor allocation wedge between agriculture
and manufacturing. Hence, manufacturing appears to be central in understanding the diﬀerential
performance of the two states.
For our two states, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd policies that correspond exactly to our wedges. Never-
theless, we provide evidence suggesting several policies or regulations that might matter. For the
manufacturing sector, we examine wage data, strikes and lockout data, as well as compositional
shifts between the formal manufacturing sector and the informal manufacturing sector. These
data suggest that increased burdens were placed on the formal sector in West Bengal by labor
and industrial regulations. In addition, we show that public investments in human capital and
physical capital lagged in West Bengal; this suggests ineﬃcient use of ﬁscal resources. Overall, our
evidence points to a systematic worsening of the business environment in West Bengal relative to
Maharashtra.
While there is a vast empirical literature on India dating back to its independence in 1947,
only a small subset of it examines diﬀerences across Indian states. Perhaps the closest paper
to ours is Besley and Burgess (2004) [9].3 They study the importance of labor regulations in the
evolution of the manufacturing sector across Indian states. Based on a detailed study of state-speciﬁc
amendments to national labor regulations, Besley and Burgess construct an index that classiﬁes
each state as pro-labor, neutral or pro-employer. They ﬁnd that pro-labor legislation reduced growth
3Several other recent papers have also examined the diﬀerential performance of Indian states. These include
Ahluwalia (2001), Bandyopadhyay (2003), Kochar et al. (2006), and Purﬁeld (2006). However, with the exception of
Bandyopadhyay, their focus is on India’s performance after 1980 or later.
3of manufacturing output, investment, and employment. While our results are consistent with their
ﬁndings, we note that their index classiﬁes both West Bengal and Maharashtra as pro-labor. Hence,
their index is not directly informative about the relation between labor regulations and the diﬀerent
development patterns in these two states. In addition, as stated above, we ﬁnd from our multi-sector
analysis that both services productivity and manufacturing productivity declined signiﬁcantly.
We conclude that explanations for West Bengal’s decline must simultaneously account for low
productivity growth in services and manufacturing, and an intersectoral misallocation of factors
associated with the manufacturing sector. In other words, explanations that focus on TFP alone
or on investment frictions alone will not be suﬃcient. We believe our conclusions will inform the
selection of driving forces for the theoretical and the empirical research that seek to explain the
decline.
In the next section we document two key facts about the two states; we also show that West
Bengal’s decline is unusual, although not unique. In section 3, we lay out and use a multi-sector
model to conduct diagnostic tests on data from the two states. Section 4 discusses our ﬁndings in
light of two possible proximate explanations for West Bengal’s decline. The ﬁnal section concludes.
Details regarding our data sources as well as on how we construct our variables are provided in the
data appendix.
2 Two Facts
In this section we present two facts. We ﬁrst illustrate the magnitude of the decline in West Bengal’s
per capita net state domestic product (NDP) relative to that of Maharashtra. We examine this
decline relative to several other cross-state and cross-country episodes. Then, we present the time
series of sectoral shares — agriculture, manufacturing, and services — of output.
Figure 1 shows the state-level distribution of per capita NDP in 1960 and 1993, expressed
relative to Maharashtra.4 The process of putting together this data is discussed in detail in the
4Data from Table 27 of the OECD publication "National Accounts of Less Developed Countries" (1967) suggests
4Figure 1: Real per capita income relative to Maharashtra; major Indian states, 1960 and 1993























* adjusted fo inter-state price differentials 
data appendix. Broadly, there were three main steps, splicing together several overlapping real
NDP series, dividing these series by population, and multiplying them by a price adjustment factor
to facilitate cross-state comparisons. In 1960, West Bengal was the richest state in India, with a per
capita income about 5 percent higher than that of Maharashtra, which was the third richest state.
However, by 1993, West Bengal’s per capita income had fallen to just 69 percent of Maharashtra’s.
Meanwhile, Maharashtra became the second richest state. In addition, the fall in West Bengal’s
relative income was the largest drop in percentage point terms across all the states.
In Figure 2, we plot the time series evolution of the per capita NDP of Maharashtra, West
Bengal, and the rest of India. The ﬁgure suggests that the decline in the relative per capita
that in the 1950s West Bengal was the richest state in both 1950 and 1955. Maharashtra was rich as well (data on
Maharashtra are imputed as the state did not exist in the 1950s). This suggests that using 1960 as a starting point
will not bias our ﬁndings in any signiﬁcant way.











income of West Bengal has been going on for decades, and that even as West Bengal is losing
ground to Maharashtra, the rest of India is catching up to West Bengal.5
It is not easy to ﬁnd similar cases involving two regions within the same country. Grouping the
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995) U.S. states data into the nine U.S. Census "divisions," we
ﬁnd that, in 1963, the top three divisions in per capita income were Paciﬁc, East North Central
(Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin), and Middle Atlantic. In the ensuing 23 years,
the average annual growth rates in these divisions ranged from 1.5 to 2.1 percent per year. The gap
between the largest and smallest growth rates, 0.6 percent per year, is less than half of the growth
diﬀerence between West Bengal and Maharashtra. China is perhaps the most natural comparison
to India. Using data from the China Data Center, University of Michigan, we ﬁnd that of the
ﬁve richest provinces in 1985 (excluding Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, which are essentially just
cities — these were the three richest provinces in both 1985 and 2005), three provinces grew 9.5 to
5It is worth pointing out that population has followed very similar paths in West Bengal and Maharashtra. West
Bengal’s population has been between 86 and 88 percent of Maharashtra’s between 1961 and 1993. So diﬀerences in
per capita NDP performance cannot be attributed to unusual population dynamics.
610.0 percent per year over the next 20 years, while the other two grew only about 7 percent per
year. So, China exhibited divergence as well, although 7 percent growth is still a very good growth
performance.
It is also not easy to ﬁnd similar cases from the cross-country data. As pointed out by Kehoe and
Ruhl (2003), there are a few examples like New Zealand and Switzerland that showed 40 percent
declines in per capita incomes relative to the U.S. between 1960 and 2000. However, New Zealand
(4 million people in 2000) and Switzerland (7 million) are tiny when compared with West Bengal
(80 million) and Maharashtra (97 million).
In Figure 3, we present the agriculture, manufacturing, and services share of (current price)
NDP for the two states, as well as the rest of India, for the period 1960-1995.6 There are three
noteworthy patterns. First, in 1960, the two states were very similar in their sectoral composition
of output. Second, the evolution of the agriculture and manufacturing shares over time was vastly
diﬀerent in West Bengal from Maharashtra. Thus, agriculture’s share of output declined much more
in Maharashtra, where it fell from 40 percent to 17 percent between 1960 and 1995. In West Bengal,
on the other hand, the agricultural share declined from 39 percent to only 30 percent during the
same period. The contrasting sectoral behavior of the two states is more evident in manufacturing.
In Maharashtra manufacturing increased its share of output between 1960 and 1995 from 22 percent
to 25 percent, while in West Bengal the manufacturing share of output declined from 20 percent
to 16 percent during this period — a process of de-industrialization. Third, the ﬁgure makes clear
that the sectoral trends of Maharashtra have been similar to the trends for the rest of India; that
is, West Bengal appears to be the state whose sectoral behavior has been atypical.
To summarize, in this section we have documented that between 1960 and 1995, West Bengal’s
per capita income fell by about 35 percent relative to Maharashtra’s (or put diﬀerently, Maharashtra
6The shares of the three sectors do not add up to one, because our break-out does not include mining, forestry,
ﬁshing, construction, and electricity.
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8gained about 50 percent relative to West Bengal). We have also seen that the two states experienced
sharply diﬀerent evolutions of agriculture’s share of total output and manufacturing’s share of total
output starting from an initial condition of very similar sectoral shares.7 These patterns motivate
our use of Maharashtra as a control and of a model with multiple sectors.
3 Model-Based Diagnostics
We now turn to a model-based diagnostic exercise to learn more about the output and factor market
forces that contributed signiﬁcantly to West Bengal’s decline. We ﬁrst write down a frictionless,
multi-sector version of the neoclassical growth model. We derive the ﬁrst order conditions of this
model, and then use the West Bengal and Maharashtra data to compute the deviations from the
ﬁrst order conditions. We then examine the implications of these deviations.8
3.1 Multi-sector Model
Consider an economy (country) composed of a number of states. The representative household
in each state maximizes the present discounted value of lifetime utility with instantaneous utility
given by:
u(c,l) = logc + ψlog(¯ l − l)
7We examined the sectoral composition of manufacturing, comparing 1979 to 1995. In West Bengal the composition
remained relatively unchanged, suggesting that a large shock to one particular manufacturing sector did not drive
the overall manufacturing performance.
8We should emphasize that the model is not intended to be a description of the true model for these two states.
Instead, it is intended as a diagnostic tool to determine the key features of the true underlying model. The primary
strength of this approach lies in the well-identiﬁed weaknesses of the frictionless environment. In particular, any
measured deviation of the data from the optimal levels implied by the ﬁrst order conditions of the frictionless
environment identiﬁes a well-deﬁned market friction.
9where c is consumption per person, l is labor supply (hours worked), and ¯ l is the total endowment
of labor hours available to the agent. The agent’s budget constraint each period is:
ct + kt+1 = wtlt + (rt + 1 − δ)kt
where k is the capital stock per person, b is the amount of assets held per person, δ is the depreciation
rate, w is the wage rate, r is the rental rate on capital, and q is the price of a one-period bond.
The ﬁnal good is the numeraire good so that all prices are expressed in units of the ﬁnal good.
Each state produces three intermediate, sectoral outputs — agriculture, manufacturing and ser-
vices, and a non-traded ﬁnal good. Labor and capital are costlessly mobile across sectors. The





where yj is total output of good j = a,m,s. xj (j = a,m,s) is the level of the labor augmenting
technology factor. The ﬁnal good is produced by combining the sectoral goods:
y = g(ˆ ys, ˆ ym, ˆ ya)
y is the output of the ﬁnal good; ˆ yj denotes the use of good j = a,m,s in producing the ﬁnal
good. We assume that the function g exhibits constant returns to scale in its three arguments.
Note that our framework allows for trade in the intermediate goods. We assume balanced trade in
each period. The non-traded ﬁnal good is consumed or invested:
yt = ct + kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt
10Perfectly competitive ﬁrms in each sector maximize proﬁts taking prices as given:
Πm
t =pmtymt − wtlmt − rtkmt
Πa
t =patyat − wtlat − rtkat
Πs
t =pstyst − wtlst − rtkst
Πt =yt − pmtˆ ymt − patˆ yat − pstˆ yst
In the next section, we will use the ﬁrst order conditions from the household and sectoral ﬁrm’s
maximization problems to develop our wedges.
3.2 Data, Wedges and Parameters
Ideally, we would have data that would enable us to make use of all the household and ﬁrm ﬁrst
order conditions for optimality. However, there are some data limitations. The most prominent
is the absence of oﬃcial data on state-level capital stocks for the agriculture and services sectors.
Consequently, we impute these two capital stocks using national data on agriculture and services
capital stocks, as well as the assumption that the state share of the national capital stock in a
sector equals the state share of national output in that sector. Further details are provided in
the data appendix. This assumption implies that capital/output ratios are essentially equated
within agriculture across states, and also within services across states. In addition, we do not
have measures of rental rates on capital or real interest rates at the state or sectoral level, and
we have measures of wages only for the manufacturing sector. Consequently, we substitute the
value marginal product of labor (VMPL) and the value marginal product of capital (VMPK) for
wages and rental rates, respectively. Details on the other data we use are also provided in the data
appendix.
The household’s ﬁrst order conditions imply that the marginal rate of substitution between labor
and leisure equals the VMPL, and that the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution equals the
VMPK + 1 − δ. Following Cole and Ohanian (2004), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004), and
11Mulligan (2005), for each ﬁrst order condition, we divide one side of the equality by the other side



















kmt+1 + 1 − δ
￿
ωl,i is the wedge in the optimal labor-leisure condition with values less than one indicating that the
marginal product of labor is higher than the marginal disutility from labor.9 ωI,i is the wedge in the
intertemporal Euler equation with a number below one indicating that savings are sub-optimally
low.10
The ﬁrms’ sectoral ﬁrst order conditions imply that the VMPK and VMPL should be equated
across sectors. We construct sectoral capital allocation wedges by dividing one sector’s VMPK by





























where i = West Bengal, Maharashtra. ωk,sm,i is the wedge in the condition for optimal capital
allocation between services and manufacturing; ωk,as,i is the wedge in the condition for optimal
9Note that the measurement of the wedge in the optimal labor-leisure condition, ω
l,i, is itself sensitive to the
wedges in the inter-sectoral labor allocation conditions. Thus, if ω
l,sm,i is systematically diﬀerent from unity then
the measured ω
l,i would depend on whether we use the value marginal product of labor in agriculture, manufacturing,
or services in the denominator of the expression for ω
l,i.
10Because we have substituted VMPK+1−δ for the rental rate, assessing whether or not the Euler equation holds
is actually a joint assessment of the Euler equation and the manufacturing ﬁrm’s optimal capital conditions holding
simultaneously.
12capital allocation between agriculture and services. Similarly, ωl,as,i is the wedge in the condition
for optimal labor allocation between agriculture and services and ωl,sm,i is the wedge for labor
allocation between services and manufacturing. A number less than one for the latter wedge, for
example, would indicate that the VMPL in manufacturing is too high or that the VMPL marginal
product of labor in services is too low. Note that the wedge in the optimal labor allocation condition





























Note that the productivity term captures, in addition to TFP, human capital and all other forces
that are not captured by labor and our measures of physical capital. Hence, to the extent that forces
like credit constraints, social networks, and lack of appropriate regulations lead to ineﬃciently low
human capital and/or an ineﬃciently low capital/output ratio, it will show up in the productivity
numbers for these two sectors.11
We should also note that by focusing only on the wedges listed above we can be agnostic about
our assumptions on intermediate goods trade between states.12 In computing the wedges, we use
data on state-level sectoral prices. These are the prices that economic agents were facing when
they were making their economic decisions. These prices could potentially have come from a free
11See, for example, Banerjee and Duﬂo (2004) and Banerjee and Munshi (2004). These papers discuss how misal-
location at the micro level can lead to aggregate shortfalls in investment and capital.
12However, our framework does not allow for intertemporal borrowing and lending, that is, net capital ﬂows between
states is not permitted. We could allow for it by suitably modifying the representative agent’s budget constraint. This
will not aﬀect the ﬁrst order conditons that we focus on (but it would create an additional set of wedges that could
potentially be examined). Hence, the wedges we focus on are essentially invariant to the speciﬁcation of openness in
both intra-temporal and intertemporal trade.
13trade regime or from some more restricted trading regime.
We parameterize the model as follows:
Parameter Description Value
α Manufacturing capital share 0.3
µ Agriculture labor share 0.45
υ Agriculture capital share 0.25
σ Services labor share 0.7
β Preferences discount factor 0.96
¯ l Annual endowment of hours 5000 hours
ψ Weight on leisure in utility function 2.24
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.04
The parameter values for β and δ are standard for a calibration to annual data. ψ and ¯ l are taken
from Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004). The parameters α, µ, and σ are more problematic
because we do not have estimates of these parameters. We set α = 0.3 and σ = 0.7 based on Abler,
Tolley, and Kripalani (1994) who estimated the capital share of the non-agricultural sector to be
0.3. Interestingly, this number is close to the labor share computed by Gollin (2002) for India as
a whole. [1] also estimated the labor share in Indian agriculture to be 0.45 and the capital share
in agriculture to be 0.25; these are the parameters we chose for µ and υ.
3.3 Results
Figures 4-8 show the evolution of the capital allocation and labor allocation wedges, and the Euler
equation wedge. The usual practice in the presentation of wedges is to normalize the value in the
initial year to one.13 There are at least two rationales for this. First, often the ﬁrst year can be
interpreted as consistent with an initial steady-state. Second, to the extent there exists non-time
13See for example Cole and Ohanian (2002) or Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007). Mulligan (2005), on the other
hand, reports the actual wedges.
14varying measurement error, normalizing the wedges eliminates that. Indeed, with one of our wedges
below we provide some supportive evidence to this. To these rationales, we add a third, which is
that because we are focused on changes in the per capita income between the two states, we are
interested in the trends in the wedges over time (and the diﬀerences in these trends between the
two states).
Nevertheless, the normalization can be potentially misleading under some circumstances (such
as when there is no measurement error). Suppose the West Bengal labor allocation wedge between
agriculture and services was initially less than one, and suppose the Maharashtra wedge was initially
equal to the West Bengal wedge. Now suppose, over time, the West Bengal wedge increased and
moved closer to one or eﬃciency, while the Maharashtra wedge remained constant. Clearly, West
Bengal is becoming more eﬃcient than Maharashtra. However, the normalized wedges would show
that West Bengal was moving further from one, while Maharashtra was staying at one, which would
suggest that West Bengal is becoming less eﬃcient than Maharashtra. In the ﬁgures that follow,
we present the un-normalized wedges in the two states; we also present the ratios of the wedges
(the wedge in West Bengal relative to Maharashtra).
Figure 4 shows the wedge for optimal capital allocation between services and manufacturing.
Both wedges were initially close to one-half in 1960, indicating that the value marginal product of
capital (VMPK) was about twice as high in manufacturing as in services. Over time, West Bengal’s
wedge ﬂuctuates a great deal, and rises sharply in the 1990s. By contrast, Maharashtra’s wedge
varied much less and was about 0.5 by 1995. In that year, West Bengal’s wedge is considerably
closer to one than its wedge in 1960, suggesting that West Bengal moved closer to eﬃciency than
Maharashtra did. However, the mean ratio of the two wedges was only 14 percent higher than the
ratio in 1960. Excluding the 1990s, it is only 5 percent higher. Consequently, this wedge does not
appear to be a signiﬁcant factor in West Bengal’s under-performance between 1960 and 1995.
The wedge for optimal capital allocation between agriculture and services is much smoother
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over time than between services and manufacturing. In both states, the wedge was initially around
two, indicating that VMPK in agriculture was about twice as high as in services. For each state the
wedge varied little around its mean value during the sample period. By 1995, West Bengal’s wedge
was just 1.4 percent higher than its 1960 value, and Maharashtra’s wedge was just 3.1 percent
higher. The average for West Bengal relative to Maharashtra over 1960-95 was 1.04.14 Clearly, this
wedge was not a margin in which major changes happened.
Note that the capital allocation wedge between agriculture and manufacturing is the product of
the above two wedges. This implies that capital allocation between agriculture and manufacturing
was close to eﬃcient in 1960 for both states, but that in West Bengal the wedge began to increase
over time, reaching two by 1995, while in Maharashtra, the wedge stayed fairly constant at around
one. Hence, trends in the two states’ capital allocation eﬃciency between agriculture and manu-
facturing are essentially the opposite as the trends between services and manufacturing. Crucially,
however, the magnitudes of the mean diﬀerence in the wedges are not large. We conclude that the
14To save space we have not included a picture of the wedge here. It is available from the authors on request.
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capital allocation wedges are not a major source of the diﬀerential performance of these two states
between 1960 and 1995.
We now turn to the labor allocation wedges. Figure 5 shows that the wedge for each state
is initially signiﬁcantly lower than one — reﬂecting the well-known characteristic of developing
countries that the value marginal product of labor (VMPL) is low in agriculture — and that both
wedges trend downward over time. This implies that for each state the gap between services’ VMPL
and agriculture’s VMPL widened. The similar behavior of the two wedges is reﬂected in the fact
that the average ratio of West Bengal’s wedge to Maharashtra’s wedge over the sample period was
only 4 percent higher than the initial wedge ratio. Hence, labor misallocation between agriculture
and services does not seem to be an important factor in understanding the diﬀerential performance
of the two states.
Figure 6 presents the labor allocation wedge between services and manufacturing. Both states’
wedges were slightly greater than 0.5 in 1960 indicating that the VMPL of manufacturing was about
twice as high as for services. Subsequently, West Bengal’s wedge rose, while Maharashtra’s fell.
17In 1995, the two wedges were 0.59 and 0.39, respectively. This suggests that West Bengal became
considerably more eﬃcient than Maharashtra over time. Indeed, the average ratio of West Bengal’s
wedge to Maharashtra’s wedge was 28 percent higher than the initial wedge ratio. However, for
manufacturing there is an alternative source of data on output and labor, the National Accounts
Statistics (NAS) and the Census of India, respectively. As a robustness check, we re-run the
labor allocation wedge between services and manufacturing with this data.15 Figure 7 shows that
with this data West Bengal’s wedge rises over time, while Maharashtra’s wedge shows little trend.
However, because both wedges are initially at a value close to 1, the ﬁgure implies that West Bengal
became less eﬃcient than Maharashtra over time.
Despite the diﬀerent initial values of the wedge generated by the diﬀerent data sources, the two
wedge computations share one feature in common. The relative wedge, that is, the ratio of West
Bengal’s wedge to Maharashtra’s wedge, on average was about the same across these two sets. As
noted above, in the ﬁrst set of wedges the average wedge ratio was 28 percent higher than the initial
wedge ratio. For the second set of wedges, the average wedge ratio was 32 percent higher than
the initial wedge ratio. Hence, while we cannot give an eﬃciency interpretation, we can infer that
the manufacturing labor productivity relative to services labor productivity decreased substantially
over time in West Bengal compared to Maharashtra. The large magnitude of this relative wedge
suggests that — regardless of which state became more eﬃcient over time — the allocation of labor
between services and manufacturing could be an important part of the diﬀerential evolution of the
two states.
As discussed above, the third labor allocation wedge, between agriculture and manufacturing,
is derived by multiplying the wedge between agriculture and services by the wedge between ser-
15This alternative data covers the entire manufacturing sector. The ASI data that is our benchmark data covers
only the registered sector. We use the ASI as our benchmark for two reasons. First, both the output and employment
data in the ASI are from the same source. Second, the ASI data includes capital stock numbers while the NAS data
does not.
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19vices and manufacturing. In 1960 the wedge was 0.09 and 0.19 in Maharashtra and West Bengal,
respectively, indicating that the VMPL of agriculture was considerably less than the VMPL of
manufacturing in both states. In both states, also, the wedge declined sharply over time, indicat-
ing increasing misallocation of labor. However, Maharashtra’s wedge declined by more than West
Bengal’s. Summarizing the labor allocation wedges, both of the wedges involving manufacturing
revealed large movements over time, as well as large diﬀerences over time between West Bengal
and Maharashtra.
Figure 8 shows the investment wedge or the wedge for optimal intertemporal allocation. In
1960, the investment wedge in West Bengal was 0.90. In Maharashtra it was 0.82. The wedge
displays some volatility, but there is very little trend over time, as both wedges rise slightly by 1993
(to 0.99 in West Bengal and 0.87 in Maharashtra). In both states, then, the wedges became slightly
more eﬃcient. Over the sample period, the average ratio of West Bengal’s wedge to Maharashtra’s
wedge was only about 6 percent lower than the initial ratio. This suggests that investment forces
were not important in explaining the weak performance of West Bengal during the 1960s onwards.
In light of footnote 9 above and the fact that the observed wedges in inter-sectoral labor allocations
are systematically diﬀerent from one, we ignore the labor-leisure wedge ωl,i.
Next, we turn to the evolution of the sectoral productivity in the two states. Figures 9-11 show
the evolution of productivity, measured in labor augmenting form, in agriculture, manufacturing,
and services. We present the state-speciﬁc productivities on the left axis; they are normalized to
equal 1 in 1960. The relative sectoral productivity of West Bengal on the right axis. Agriculture
in both West Bengal and Maharashtra became more productive between 1960 and 1995. However,
West Bengal’s agricultural productivity grew faster than Maharashtra’s. Hence, the relative pro-
ductivity wedge increased during this period, with the average level at 1.19, i.e., 19 percent above
the 1960 level. Clearly, agriculture is not the proximate cause of West Bengal’s relative decline.
The picture is quite diﬀerent in the manufacturing and services sectors. In manufacturing,
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West Bengal’s productivity declined by almost 60 percent relative to Maharashtra between 1960
and 1995. The ﬁgure shows that West Bengal’s manufacturing productivity was essentially stagnant
during this period. In the services sector, West Bengal’s productivity declined about 25 percent
relative to Maharashtra during the same period. However, unlike in manufacturing, West Bengal’s
productivity in services did grow; Maharashtra’s productivity grew faster, especially from the 1980s
onward.
We conclude our discussion of the wedges by making the following observations. For both of
the labor allocation wedges involving manufacturing, a wedge gap opened up over time between the
two states. Because of the real possibility of measurement error in the wedge between services and
manufacturing, we cannot conclude that West Bengal’s wedges diminished over time. In the case
that they did, the wedge diminution would partially oﬀset the loss from West Bengal’s relatively
low manufacturing productivity growth. In the case that the wedges did not diminish or even grew
over time, this force would complement the low manufacturing productivity growth in accounting
for West Bengal’s poor performance.
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3.4 Robustness Exercises
We engage in two robustness exercises. We examine the intertemporal savings wedge with our
imputed capital measures. The results for agricultural capital and for services capital are very
similar to our main results with manufacturing capital. The correlation coeﬃcients between the
Euler wedge with manufacturing and the other two Euler wedges are 0.90 (agriculture) and 0.87
(services).
We also create the agriculture and services capital stocks using an alternative imputation tech-
nique that assumes there is no misallocation of capital across sectors within a state. In other
words, within each state, the VMPK for agriculture, for services, and for manufacturing are identi-
cal. Employing this assumption in conjunction with data on the manufacturing capital stock yields
measures of services capital and agricultural capital for each state. This assumption automatically
rules out any non-zero capital allocation wedges. The labor allocation wedges do not depend on
the capital stock. Only the sectoral productivities are potentially aﬀected by the use of this alter-
native imputed capital stock; however, we ﬁnd that the evolution of both services productivity and
23agricultural productivity in each state is virtually unchanged relative to our benchmark imputation
approach. The correlation coeﬃcient between the two measures of services productivity is 0.85; the
correlation of the two measures of agricultural productivity is 0.93.
4 Linking the Wedges to Additional Data
In this section, we provide two sets of evidence on West Bengal and Maharashtra that could
potentially shed further light on the movements in our measured wedges.
4.1 Manufacturing and Labor
The wedge diagnostics point to the central role played by manufacturing, in particular, and, to
a lesser extent, services — but along particular dimensions. Among the labor wedges, the wedges
between services and manufacturing, and between agriculture and manufacturing, widened substan-
tially. In addition, manufacturing productivity in West Bengal relative to Maharashtra declined at
a much greater rate than in agriculture and services. We now examine additional data that may
shed light on the trends in West Bengal’s manufacturing sector.16
As a ﬁrst step, we compare our measured VMPL in manufacturing to manufacturing real wages.
Figure 12 plots the VMPL in manufacturing in West Bengal relative to Maharashtra, as well as
the corresponding relative manufacturing real wage between 1960 and 1995.
In 1960, relative real wages were almost the same as the relative VMPL in manufacturing. This
is what optimality in a frictionless environment would predict. From 1965 onward, however, the
relative VMPL in West Bengal declined from 80 percent of Maharashtra to 40 percent by 1995,
while relative real wages rose from 80 percent to almost 165 percent of Maharashtra by 1992 (the
last year for which we have the manufacturing wage data)! The emergence of higher real wages at
the same time that labor productivity was declining in the state suggests that there may have been
an increase in the political strength of labor in West Bengal during this period.
16Data constraints prevent us from also examining the services sector.
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One indicator of labor’s strength is the incidence of industrial action (strikes and lockouts),
which reﬂects a breakdown of working relations between labor and owners of capital. In Figure 13,
we plot the ratio of man-days lost to man-days worked in West Bengal and Maharashtra between
1960 and 1995, as well in several states that experienced a signiﬁcant amount of industrial action.
The ﬁgure shows that since 1967 the man-days lost ratio in West Bengal was always higher than in
Maharashtra, with the exception of one year, 1982. During this period the mean for the man-days
lost ratio in West Bengal was almost three times that in Maharashtra. With the exception of
Kerala in the ﬁrst half of the period, no other state experienced the level of industrial action of
West Bengal.17
17Another sign of increasing labor power in West Bengal during this period is the rapid expansion in the number of
registered trade unions in West Bengal. It increased by a factor of 2.5, from 2057 in 1957 to 4808 in 1970. During the
same period, the number of registered trade unions in Maharashtra increased from 1586 to only 2560. Unfortunately,
our data on trade unions in West Bengal does not extend beyond 1970. The numbers on trade unions take on
additional meaning once it is noted that after 1965 a signiﬁcant fraction of manufacturing output in West Bengal
shifted into the un-registered sector which was theoretically free of trade unions.








































We interpret movements in these variables as indicators of growing labor power and a possible
worsening of the business environment in West Bengal. Because organized business was mostly
concentrated in manufacturing, any negative eﬀects of a worsening business climate in the state
would likely be felt most by the manufacturing sector.
So how did manufacturing react? Figure 14 shows that the manufacturing share of total NDP
in West Bengal declined between the early 1960s and the early 1990s. Moreover, West Bengal
(along with Bihar and Assam) was clearly an outlier in this, because the manufacturing share of
output expanded in the other states.
Because the eﬀect of stronger labor unions is probably felt more intensively in organized (reg-
istered) industry, in which, for example, workers are allowed to organize, one would expect to see
a shift in the composition of manufacturing output from organized industry to small-scale, unor-
ganized production if the labor environment had indeed worsened signiﬁcantly during this period.
To investigate this, we examine the behavior of the share of registered manufacturing in total man-
ufacturing output in each state. Figure 15 shows that registered manufacturing’s share of total










































27manufacturing output was slightly higher in West Bengal than in Maharashtra, 79 percent versus
75 percent during the ﬁve-year period 1960-64. However, by 1991-95, in West Bengal this share
had declined to just 47 percent, while in Maharashtra it declined slightly to 70 percent. Moreover,
except for Bihar, the other states of India were more like Maharashtra than West Bengal. Again,
West Bengal is an outlier.
The preceding discussion suggests that focusing on the manufacturing sector as in Besley and
Burgess [10], as well as in Aghion et al [2], (in their studies of Indian states) would probably reveal
most of the key reasons for West Bengal’s poor performance. However, our wedge diagnostic exercise
suggests a key caveat to the Besley-Burgess account. Their empirical framework is motivated by
a bargaining model of ﬁrms and workers; in particular, contracts are incomplete in the sense that
there is a hold-up problem. An increase in bargaining power raises the eﬀective cost of capital.
This, in turn, leads to a decline in output in registered manufacturing, as well as a shift in the
composition of manufacturing output from registered to unregistered. This is consistent with the
evidence we presented above. However, an increase in the cost of capital should show up as a larger
wedge in the intertemporal Euler equation. Because we do not ﬁnd evidence of increased Euler
wedges, we conclude that this particular type of labor market ineﬃciency is unlikely to be a key
driving force in West Bengal’s decline. Rather, to the extent union and bargaining power matter,
it must be through some other channel than raising the eﬀective cost of capital.
4.2 Infrastructure
One proximate source of West Bengal’s productivity decline in services and manufacturing might
be infrastructure. Here, we present evidence on social infrastructure (human capital) and physical
infrastructure (roads and electricity). We construct a state-wide measure of human capital follow-
ing the method of [19]. Details on the data sources are provided in the data appendix. Figure
16 illustrates human capital for West Bengal, Maharashtra, and India. It shows that Maharash-
tra’s human capital surpassed West Bengal’s during the 1970s. In 1961, human capital in West
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Bengal was 8 percent higher than in Maharashtra, but by 1991, it was 3 percent lower than in
Maharashtra.18
[9] have data on two measures of physical infrastructure stocks. Between 1960 and 1987, West
Bengal’s surfaced state roads increased from about 6,000 km to 17,000 km. During that period,
Maharashtra’s surfaced state roads more than quintupled from 39,000 km to 212,000 km. Similarly,
in 1960, total installed generating capacity was virtually identical in Maharashtra and West Bengal,
700 megawatt versus 680 megawatts. However, by 1989, Maharashtra’s capacity had increased to
8200 megawatts, while West Bengal’s rose only to 2600 megawatts. In addition, according to a
ﬁrm-level survey of manufacturing ﬁrms conducted jointly by the World Bank and the CII in 2000
(see [15] and[28]), in West Bengal, 97.2 percent of the ﬁrms had their own generators, while in
Maharashtra it was only 44.4 percent of ﬁrms. Hence, West Bengal was hampered by low capacity
18In a previous version of this paper, we conducted a Hall-Jones levels accounting exercise to ascertain the sources
of the growth diﬀerential between West Bengal and Maharashtra from 1961 to 1991. We found that diﬀerences in
human capital growth accounted for 23 percent of the overall growth diﬀerential.
29and by low delivery of that capacity.
5 Conclusion
Our wedge diagnostics yielded two broad sources of change in West Bengal relative to Maharashtra
between 1960 and 1995. First, productivity growth in both the manufacturing and services sectors
was considerably less in West Bengal. Second, the two labor allocation wedges involving manufac-
turing changed substantially within and between the two states. Thus, there was an intratemporal
misallocation of labor that increased over time. Interestingly, our analysis suggests that this in-
crease in misallocation could have been greater in Maharashtra than in West Bengal — at least
partly because manufacturing productivity grew so much more rapidly in Maharashtra. In other
words, the slow productivity growth in West Bengal in manufacturing, and also services, could have
helped prevent labor ineﬃciencies from growing more rapidly. Veriﬁcation of this possibility could
come from the sort of wedge accounting exercises advocated by [12].
Our diagnostics point to several other forces that were not sources of West Bengal’s relative
decline. The agriculture sector actually gained in productivity (relative to Maharasthra). Labor
does not appear to have been increasingly misallocated between the agriculture and services sectors.
In addition, there is little evidence of large intertemporal or intratemporal misallocations of capital.
Our results help narrow the set of explanations for West Bengal’s poor performance. For
example, explanations based on productivity alone will not be enough. Moreover, our diﬀering
results across sectors indicate that a single sector model will also not be enough. Explanations
based on credit constraints, which have been identiﬁed as a source of low investment in India, can
only matter to the extent that they show up as low productivity or as misallocation of capital
between services or agriculture and manufacturing. Consequently, what is needed is a multi-sector
model with multiple "shocks" in which the transmission channels are productivity and intratemporal
misallocation of labor.
We suggest a few of the possible shocks. We presented evidence that the decline in manufactur-
30ing in West Bengal could be tied to the rise in labor power in that state. We also present evidence
that public investments in social and physical infrastructure in West Bengal declined substantially.
One set of distortions that we have not examined would be those associated with the mobility of
goods and factors between states. This is an important avenue for future research.
References
[1] Abler, David G., George S. Tolley, and G.K. Kripalani, 1994, Technical Change and Income
Distribution in Indian Agriculture. Boulder, CA. Westview Press.
[2] Aghion, Philippe, Robin Burgess, Stephen Redding, and Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2007, "The Unequal
Eﬀects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in India." forthcoming,
American Economic Review.
[3] Ahluwalia, Montek S., 2001, "State Level Performance Under Economic Reforms in India."
Stanford University Center for Research on Economic Development and Policy Reform, Work-
ing Paper 96.
[4] Bandyopadhyay, Sanghamitra, 2003, "Convergence Club Empirics: Some Dynamics and Ex-
planations of Unequal Growth Across Indian States." WIDER Discussion Paper 2003/77.
[5] Banerjee, Abhijit, and Kaivan Munshi, 2004, "How Eﬃciently is Capital Allocated? Evidence
from the Knitted Garment Industry in Tirupur." Review of Economic Studies 71, 19-42.
[6] Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duﬂo, 2004, "Growth Theory through the Lens of Development
Economics." manuscript, MIT, forthcoming, Handbook of Economic Growth.
[7] Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1992, "Convergence," Journal of Political Economy
100 (2), 223-251.
[8] Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Economic Growth. New York, McGraw-Hill.
[9] Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess, 2004, "Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Perfor-
mance? Evidence from India," Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (1), 91-134.
[10] Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess, 2002, "Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Perfor-
31mance? Evidence from India," CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 3260.
[11] Census of India, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, Central Statistical Oﬃce, India.
[12] Chari, V. V., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Ellen McGrattan, 2007, "Business Cycle Accounting,"
Econometrica 75 (3), 781-836.
[13] Cole, Harold L., and Lee Ohanian, 2002, "The U.S. and U.K. Great Depressions through the
Lens of Neoclassical Growth Theory," American Economic Review 92 (2), 28-32.
[14] Cole, Harold L., and Lee Ohanian, 2004, "New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great
Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Political Economy 112 (4), 779-816.
[15] Dollar, David et al., 2002, "Competitiveness of Indian Manufacturing: Results from a Firm-
Level Survey," World Bank WP# 31797.
[16] Duraismay, P., 2002, "Changes in Returns to Education in India, 1983-94: by Gender, Age-
Cohort and Location," Economics of Education Review 21, 609-22.
[17] Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation, CD-ROM on "Domestic Product of
States of India, 1960-61 to 2000-01" and on "National Account Statistics of India, 1950-51 to
2000-01."
[18] Gollin, Douglas, 2002, "Getting Income Shares Right," Journal of Political Economy 110 (2),
458-74.
[19] Hall, Robert, and Charles Jones, 1999, "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More
Output per Worker than Others?," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 83-116.
[20] Ingram, Beth F., Narayana Kocherlakota, and N. Eugene Savin, 1994, "Explaining Business
Cycles: A Multiple Shock Approach." Journal of Monetary Economics 34, 415-428.
[21] Kehoe, Timothy, and Kim Ruhl, 2003, "Recent Great Depressions: Aggregate Growth in New
Zealand and Switzerland," manuscript, University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis.
[22] Kochhar, Kalpana, Utsav Kumar, Raghuram Rajan, Arvind Subramanian, and Ioannis Tokat-
32lidis, 2006, "India’s Pattern of Development: What Happened, What Follows," International
Monetary Fund WP/06/22.
[23] Mulligan, Casey B., 2005, "Public Policies as Speciﬁcation Errors," Review of Economic Dy-
namics 8, 902-926.
[24] Ozler, Berk, Gaurav Datt and Martin Ravallion, 1996, "A Database on Poverty and Growth
in India." World Bank.
[25] Psacharopoulos, George, 1994, "Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update."
World Development 22, 1325-43.
[26] Purﬁeld, Catriona, 2006, "Mind the Gap — Is Economic Growth in India Leaving Some States
Behind?" International Monetary Fund WP/06/113.
[27] Veeramani, C., and Bishwanath Goldar, 2004, "Investment Climate and Total Factor Produc-
tivity in Manufacturing: Analysis of Indian States," ICRIER WP #127.
[28] World Bank, 2002, "Improving the Investment Climate in India," Manuscript.
33A Data Appendix
Our data come from many sources. The primary sources are the Census of India for 1961, 1971,
1981, and 1991, and three CD-ROMs from the Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) Research
Foundation database ("Domestic Product of States of India, 1960-61 to 2000-01," "National Ac-
count Statistics of India, 1950-51 to 2000-01," and "Annual Survey of Industries, 1973-74 to 1997-
98"). Data on population, employment, and schooling are drawn from the Census. Data on net
state domestic product (NDP), sector-level NDP, and all-India capital, draw from EPW. Most of
these data are available in current prices and constant prices.
The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) provides data on registered manufacturing output, em-
ployment, capital, earnings, and labor activity. The ASI manufacturing data is supplemented by
manufacturing data from Besley and Burgess (2004). These data are from the ASI, as well, but
they extend further back, to 1960. (We thank Robin Burgess for sending us this data.)
We also use the World Bank data base created by Ozler, Datt, and Ravallion (1996), primarily
for measures of price indices that control for inter-state price diﬀerentials. The World Bank data
set also provides data on consumption.
We now describe the data sources and variable construction (further details are available from
the authors on request):
A.1 Two Facts Section
The real per capita NDP numbers underlying Figures 1 and 2 were constructed in three main
steps. First, several constant-price NDP series from the Domestic Product of the States of India
CD-ROM (DPSI) were spliced together. For the period 1960-61 through 1993-94 (hereafter, "1960"
means "1960-61"), there are four constant-price NDP series, each based on prices for a particular
year (1960, 1970, 1980, and 1993) and each covering a subset of the overall period. The splicing
procedure involves two parts. First, for years in which more than one constant-price NDP series
exists, the more recent NDP series are used. Second, to convert the 1980 series into 1993 prices,
a conversion factor is needed. This conversion factor is obtained by ﬁnding the ﬁrst year that
two series have in common, e.g., 1993, and then dividing NDP in 1993 measured in 1993 prices
by NDP in 1993 measured in 1980 prices. This ratio is then used to convert all other years for
which the 1980 constant-price series is the relevant series. A similar exercise is done for the other
constant-price series. At the end, we have a single, real NDP series for each state measured in 1993
prices. Second, these series are divided by population. The population data are obtained from
the census. We linearly interpolate to obtain estimates of population for the non-census years.
Third, we multiply by an adjustment factor that facilitates cross-state comparisons. In particular,
we use two consumer price indices (CPI) drawn from the World Bank data base. One CPI is for
agricultural laborers and the other is for industrial workers. Both indices adjust for inter-state cost
of living diﬀerences.19 We take a simple average of these two indices’ values for 1993, and we then
multiply this average by the constant-price NDP series. This renders the series comparable across
states. In Figure 1, the "ﬁnal" NDP per capita value is divided by the corresponding value for
Maharashtra. In Figure 2, we add all states other than Maharashtra and West Bengal together
to form the rest of India aggregate. The states include Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat,
Haryana, Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan,
19See the documentation associated with Ozler, Datt, and Ravallion (1996) for more details on how these CPI
indices were constructed.
34Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh.
The sectoral output shares presented in ﬁgure 3 are created from agriculture, total manufactur-
ing, services, and overall DPSI NDP current price (nominal) data spliced in a similar manner to
the constant price (real) series discussed above. The sum of the sectoral shares is less than one, as
overall NDP includes forestry and ﬁshing, mining, construction, and electricity. The Rest of India
aggregate is composed of the same states as in ﬁgure 2, except for Orissa, which lacks sectoral level
data). These data all draw from the Domestic Product of States of India CD-ROM.
A.2 Model-Based Diagnostics Section
In our model diagnostics section, there are six key sets of variables: real state NDP per capita
(total and at the sector level), sector-level labor, real personal consumption, sectoral and overall
price deﬂators derived from real and nominal NDP series, manufacturing capital stock, and the
agriculture and services capital stocks.
The real state NDP variables are from the EPW, and are constructed in the same manner as
the data underlying ﬁgures 1 and 2, except we do not control for inter-state price diﬀerentials.
It is important to note that the real NDP variables are used for two purposes, ﬁrst, to represent
output in the wedge calculations in the ﬁgures, and second, along with the nominal NDP series,
to back out the price deﬂators from which the relative price series are derived. For agriculture,
services, and total NDP, the real DPSI NDP series are used for both these purposes. However, for
manufacturing, the DPSI registered manufacturing real and nominal series are used to back out the
manufacturing price deﬂator series, but the ASI registered manufacturing output series ‘net value
added’ is the actual manufacturing output series used in the wedge calculations. The ASI output
series is given in nominal terms; it was converted to real terms using the registered manufacturing
price deﬂator created from the DPSI real and nominal registered manufacturing output series.
We used the ASI data as the single source for all of the key manufacturing variables used
to construct the wedges: capital, labor, and output. As there is no comparable survey for the
agriculture or services sectors, our labor data for these two sectors draws from the census, and our
output data is from the DPSI NDP series. No data for capital exists at the state level for these
two sectors.
We deﬁne agricultural labor as the sum of the Census categories "cultivators" and "agricultural
laborers." Services labor is deﬁned as the sum of the categories "trade and commerce" workers,
"transport, storage, and communications" workers, and "other services" workers. These data are
linearly interpolated for the non-Census years. The ASI labor data used is "registered manufac-
turing employees." This series is drawn from Besley and Burgess (2004) for the years 1960-73, and
the ASI CD-ROM for the years 1974 onward. (According to the Registered Manufacturing Act of
1958, manufacturing ﬁrms were required to "register" if they used electrical power and had at least
10 workers, or if they used no power but had at least 20 workers.)
Measuring employment in each census year is complicated by the fact that during the period we
study, there were two major conceptual and deﬁnitional changes on the measurement of workers,
one at the 1971 census and one at the 1981 census. In the 1971 census, the underlying concept
that diﬀerentiated a worker from a non-worker was changed from "labour time disposition" to
"gainful occupation." In particular, the reference period for agricultural work was changed from
the "greater part of the working season" to the entire year. This led to a decline in the all-India
reported number of workers between 1961 and 1971 by almost 5 percent, a period in which India’s
population aged 15 and over increased by 23 percent! This decline was more than accounted for by
35a reported decline in the number of female rural workers, which fell by 50 percent.
The second major conceptual changed occurred in 1981, in which workers were now categorized
as main and marginal according to whether they worked for the major part of the year or not.
The idea behind this was to come up with a concept similar to the 1971 census but also to provide
comparability with earlier censuses. Thus the main workers concept in 1981 is comparable to the
workers concept in 1971, and the main-plus-marginal workers concept in 1981 is broadly comparable
to the workers concept in 1961.20
Real personal consumption is constructed as follows. Nominal per capita consumption expendi-
ture is from the World Bank data base variable "overall mean per capital monthly expenditures by
state." There are separate variables for rural and urban areas. An (all-India) population weighted
average of these two variables is used to create the ﬁnal monthly nominal per capita expenditure
series. These series are multiplied by 12 to yield an annual series. Each series is then deﬂated by
the implicit NDP deﬂator derived from dividing the current price NDP series by the constant price
NDP series.
The manufacturing capital stock data is from the ASI and Besley and Burgess (2004). We use
the "ﬁxed capital stock" variable, which also is for registered ﬁrms only. This is deﬂated by the
overall state NDP implicit price deﬂator, i.e., the same deﬂator used to deﬂate the consumption
variable.
Unlike the manufacturing capital stock, there is no oﬃcial state-level series for agricultural and
services capital stocks. We impute each state’s agriculture capital stock by assuming that the
state’s share of India’s nominal agricultural capital stock equals the state’s nominal share of India’s
agricultural output. To construct each state’s services capital stock we apply the same exercise for
the following services sectors: transport, storage and communication; trade, hotels, and restaurants;
banking, insurance, and real estate; community, social, and personal services; other services, and
then aggregate across these sectors. We then deﬂated each capital stock by the overall state NDP
implicit price deﬂator.
20There remains the issue of comparing 1961 and 1971. We adopt three approaches. The ﬁrst is to use the originally
reported census numbers for 1961 and 1971, as well as "main" workers in 1981 and 1991. This is our benchmark. The
second is to employ oﬃcial adjustments made in 1971 to the 1971 census and the 1961 census to make them more
compatible. In particular, a new sample was conducted late in 1971 in which participants were asked the questions
from the 1961 census. The resulting outcome led to an adjusted 1971 census. In addition, the change in participation
rates between 1961 and the adjusted 1971 census is used to create an adjusted 1961 census that are the values that
ensure that the change in participation between adjusted 1961 and 1971 is the same as between 1961 and adjusted
1971. These adjustments provide two alternatives, then. One alternative uses the original 1961 numbers, the adjusted
1971 numbers, and the appropriate categories for 1981 and 1991 (main plus marginal workers). The second alternative
uses the adjusted 1961 numbers, the original 1971 numbers, and the appropriate categories for 1981 and 1991 (main
workers). The third approach is to employ adjustments along the lines of Abler, Tolley, and Kripalani (1994), who
use data from the National Sample Survey (NSS) to impute a workforce for 1971. This adjustment essentially ties
the number of workers more closely to the growth of the working age population.
Given that our primary goal is to compare West Bengal to Maharashtra, if the changing census deﬁnitions over
time do not aﬀect West Bengal and Maharashtra diﬀerently, then the relative comparisons are unaﬀected. However,
female participation rates in Maharashtra historically have been much higher than in West Bengal (in 1961 it was
38 percent compared to 8 percent). Thus, the underreporting of women had a larger eﬀect on Maharashtra than on
West Bengal. Consequently, for robustness, we employ all three approaches — the benchmark approach, as well as
the three adjustments in the other two approaches.
36A.3 Linking the Wedges to Additional Data Section
The sectoral NDP, labor and price deﬂator series described in the model-based diagnostics section
are used to construct the relative (WB to Mah) sectoral value marginal product of labor series in
ﬁgure 11. In ﬁgure 11, we derive the relative wage series from the nominal variable “earnings” for
West Bengal and Maharashtra, drawn from the Besley and Burgess ASI data set. This variable is
deﬁned as the “per capital annual earnings of employees in manufacturing industries (rps.)". To
convert to real terms, the nominal series is deﬂated by the overall price index that we backed out
from the total NDP data.
For Figure 12, data for days lost to strikes and lock-outs and for days worked are also drawn
from Besley and Burgess and the ASI CD-ROM. We use the variables for total "man-days lost
to industrial action" from Besley and Burgess. For total days worked, we use the interpolated
man-days of employees series from Besley and Burgess (1960-73) and the total man-days worked
series from ASI CD-ROM (1974 onward).
Figures 13 and 14 are based on the DPSI registered and total manufacturing NDP and the DPSI
total overall NDP series. For Figure 13, we used the same total manufacturing sectoral shares as in
Figure 3, except that the averages of the ﬁrst and last ﬁve years of the series for West Bengal are
contrasted. For Figure 14, we calculate the registered manufacturing share of total manufacturing
using the same total manufacturing series (as in Figure 13) in the denominator and the registered
manufacturing series in the numerator.
Human capital and employment are drawn from the India census. We focus on the four census
years 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991. For human capital, we use the census tables that classify workers
by type and by level of education and that classify workers by industrial category and by level
of education. These data divide the work force into several schooling categories. We convert
these categories into years of schooling as follows. "Literate without any formal schooling/below
primary": 2 years; "Primary": 5 years; "Middle": 8 years; "Matriculation/secondary": 10 years;
"Higher secondary / intermediate / pre-university or non-technical/technical diploma or certiﬁcate
not equal to degree": 12 years; "University degree or post-graduate degree other than technical
degree/Technical degree of diploma equal to degree or post-graduate degree (includes engineering,
medicine, and teaching): 16 years. 21 From these data, the share of the worker population which has
completed each level of education can be calculated for each census year. This vector of education
weights is multiplied by φ(E) to obtain a measure of the log of human capital per unit labor.
Our functional form for φ(E) is piecewise linear and draws from Psacharopoulos (1994). for the
ﬁrst four years of education the rate of return is 13.2 percent, for the next four years the rate of
return is 10.1 percent, and any year of schooling after that has a rate of return of 6.8 percent.
21Our calculations yield an average years of schooling for West Bengal and for Maharashtra in 1981 (1991) that are
about a half-year below (a half-year above) the India years of schooling number, based on 1985, from the Barro-Lee
data set.
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